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R. v. New York City Department of Education
Nos., 02-9471, 02-9472, 02-0473 (2d Cir. May 10, 2005); Clearinghouse Number: 55906
Description
Endorsement of Settlement Agreement by City Education Department’s Hearing Officer Renders Plaintiffs “Prevailing Parties” for Purposes of Attorney Fee Awards, Second Circuit Rules
Abstract
The Second Circuit upheld a district court’s award of
attorney fees to parents whose administrative challenges under the
Individuals with Disabilities in Education Act concluded in
settlement, and the court found that allowing rates of $350 to $375
per hour was not an abuse of the district court’s discretion.
Plaintiff parents brought four separate administrative actions
against the New York City Department of Education to challenge the
special education programs that defendant provided
plaintiffs’ children. Two of the hearings ended in decisions
on the merits for plaintiffs, and in the two others the hearing
officers issued orders that incorporated the parties’
settlement terms. When defendant refused their attorney fee
request, plaintiffs sued for the fees in federal court. Defendant
maintained that the hourly rates sought were unreasonable and that
those plaintiffs whose hearings ended in settlement were not
prevailing parties because the resolution was not on the merits and
because the “so ordered” settlement agreements were not
consent decrees as required for a fee award by Buckhannon Board and
Care Home v. West Virginia Department of Health and Human
Resources, 532 U.S. 598 (2001) (Clearinghouse No. xxxxx). The
Second Circuit found that plaintiffs whose hearings settled
received the administrative analog of a consent decree.
Interpreting the Act’s directive that a fee award use the
prevailing community rate, the Second Circuit found that selecting
the southern district of New York as the “community,”
rather than the community of all practitioners appearing before
defendant in administrative actions, was within the district
court’s discretion.
