De La Mota v. United States Department of Education

No. 03-6257 (2d Cir. June 14, 2005); Clearinghouse Number: 55902

Description

U.S. Department of Education’s Statutory Interpretation in Informal Handbook and E-Mail Does Not Warrant Judicial Deference, Second Circuit Says

Abstract

The Second Circuit rejected the U.S. Department of Education’s informal interpretation that restricted eligibility for Perkins loan cancellation for borrowers working on behalf of high-risk, low-income children. Three attorneys employed by New York City’s children’s services administration sued Education Department and two law schools when schools denied their requests for loan cancellation. Schools based the denials on an Education Department handbook provision and an Education Department staff member’s e-mail guidance restricting cancellation to those working “directly” and “exclusively” for low-income children. (Defendants claimed that plaintiffs were not representing children directly because plaintiffs’ client was the city.) The district court deferred to Education Department’s interpretation of the governing statute and granted Education Department’s summary judgment motion. The Second Circuit reversed the district court and remanded, finding that Education Department’s narrowing of eligibility did not warrant deference under either Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Counsel, 467 U.S. 837 (1984), or Skidmore v. Swift, 323 U.S. 134 (1944). Chevron deference did not apply to an agency’s informal, ad hoc interpretation, the Second Circuit held. Since the interpretation at issue lacked “thoroughness, validity, and power to persuade,” it did not warrant Skidmore “respect” either. Without a basis for deference to Education Department’s interpretation, the Second Circuit held that plaintiffs met the statutory standard for loan cancellation.

Additional Information

Attorney Information
Docket Date
2005-06-14 05:00:00+00:00

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