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Thomas v. Mallett
No. 03AP1528 (Wis. Sup. Ct. July 15, 2005) ; Clearinghouse Number: 55844
Description
Where Plaintiff Cannot Identify Paint Manufacturer Responsible for Harm, Wisconsin Supreme Court Extends “Risk Contribution” Theory of Liability to Lead Poisoning
Abstract
The Wisconsin Supreme Court allowed plaintiff, a minor with
elevated blood lead levels due, he alleged, to ingestion of paint
chips, to proceed to trial against defendant pigment manufacturers
under Wisconsin’s “risk contribution” theory of
negligence. Although plaintiff could not determine which defendant,
if any, made the white lead carbonate in the paint he took into his
system, under Collins v. Eli Lilly Company, 342 N.W.2d 37 (1984),
cert. denied sub nom. E.R. Squibb & Sons v. Collins, 469 U.S.
826 (1984), the court reversed the lower court’s granting of
summary judgment to defendants. In Collins the court said that a
state constitutional provision gave it “the ability to create
an adequate remedy when one did not exist.” Here the court
said that the same policy reasons warranted extending the risk
contribution theory: each defendant contributed to the risk of
injury and thus shared culpability, and defendants were in a better
position than plaintiff to absorb the cost. Although plaintiff had
obtained recovery from landlords and therefore was not deprived of
a remedy, the court said that the state constitution guaranteed an
adequate remedy; it expressed “serious concern” with
defendants’ ”attempt to displace all of the blame for
lead poisoning … on landlords.” Defendants contended
that the extended time span during which the paint that allegedly
injured plaintiff could have been applied—from 1900 and 1905
when the houses in question were built until a ban on lead paint in
1978—denied them any reasonable ability to exculpate
themselves, but the court characterized this as an argument that
“their negligent conduct should be excused because they got
away with it for too long.” The court rejected
plaintiff’s theories of enterprise liability and civil
conspiracy, found defendants’ constitutional claims
premature, and remanded the case for trial.
