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Smith v. City of Jackson
No. 03-1160 (U.S. Sup. Ct. Mar. 30, 2005) ; Clearinghouse Number: 55841
Description
Age Discrimination in Employment Act Authorizes Recovery in Disparate-Impact Cases Comparable to Griggs
Abstract
The Supreme Court held that the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act (ADEA) authorizes recovery in disparate-impact cases comparable
to Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
Respondent city, in revising its employee pay plan, granted raises
to all police officers and police dispatchers in an attempt to
bring their starting salaries up to the regional average. Officers
with less than five years’ service received proportionately
greater raises than those with more seniority, and most officers
over the age of 40 had more than five years of service.
Petitioners, a group of older officers, filed suit under the ADEA
claiming that they were adversely affected by respondent’s
pay plan because of their age. The district court granted
respondent’s motion for summary judgment. Affirming, the
Fifth Circuit held that disparate-impact claims are categorically
unavailable under the ADEA, but it assumed that the facts alleged
by petitioners would entitled them to relief under Griggs,
which announced a disparate-impact theory of recovery for cases
brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Affirming,
the Court found that petitioners had not set forth a valid
disparate-impact claim. Finding that the ADEA authorizes recovery
in disparate-impact cases comparable to Griggs, the Court
noted that, except for the substitution of “age” for
“race, color, religion, sex, or national origin,” the
language of the section 4(a)(2) of the ADEA and section 703(a)(2)
or Title VII is identical. Unlike Title VII, however, the ADEA
significantly narrows its coverage by permitting any
“otherwise prohibited” action “where the
differentiation is based on reasonable factors other than
age.” The Court found that, where petitioners have done
little more than point out that the pay plan is relatively less
generous to older workers than to younger ones, they have not
identified any specific test, requirement, or practice within the
pay plan that has an adverse impact on older workers. Further, the
Court noted that that the city’s plan was based on reasonable
factors other than age.
