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A. v. Barnes
No. 1:02-CV-1686-MHA (N.D. Ga. February 8, 2005) ; Clearinghouse Number: 55831
Description
Children Have Constitutional Right to Counsel in Deprivation Proceedings
Abstract
The district court ruled that plaintiffs—Georgia foster
children—are entitled, under the Georgia constitution’s
due process clause and state statutes, to effective counsel in all
deprivation proceedings. Plaintiffs, suing state and county
defendants in state court, challenged conditions in emergency
shelters. Among plaintiffs’ allegations was that county
defendants failed to provide adequate and effective legal
representation in deprivation proceedings. Defendants removed the
case to federal court, and county defendants moved to dismiss the
right to counsel claim. Defendants argued that state law entitled
plaintiffs to counsel only in termination of parental rights
proceedings, that injunctive relief was inappropriate because
plaintiffs failed to show irreparable injury and had an adequate
legal remedy through damage actions or state bar disciplinary
proceedings, and that the appropriate level of funding for child
advocacy attorneys was a legislative function. The court denied
their motion. It said that neither damage actions nor state bar
complaints could cure the systemic deficiencies that plaintiffs
alleged; the systemic deficiencies did not arise from child
advocate attorneys’ “personal deficiencies.” The
court found that plaintiffs had fundamental liberty interests at
stake even after they were in state custody and applied the
three-part test in Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319
(1976), to determine what due process required. The court concluded
that only the appointment of counsel, not court-appointed special
advocates or others, could “effectively mitigate the risk of
significant errors” and that, because of the state’s
interest in children’s well-being, the appointment of counsel
promoted the state’s interest as well as that of the
children. Plaintiffs’ evidence of child advocate
attorneys’ large caseloads and resulting inability to carry
out minimum legal tasks created a genuine issue of material fact as
to whether plaintiffs received effective counsel.
