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Leocal v. Ashcroft
No. 03-583 (U.S. Sup. Ct. Nov. 9, 2004) ; Clearinghouse Number: 55804
Description
Conviction for Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol Is Not a “Crime of Violence” That May Subject a Resident Alien to Deportation
Abstract
The Supreme Court has held that driving under the influence of
alcohol (DUI) is not a crime of violence that may render an
immigrant deportable under 18 U.S.C. § 16. Petitioner, a
lawful permanent resident of the United States, pleaded guilty to
two counts of DUI and causing serious bodily injury in an accident,
in violation of Florida law. While he was serving his prison
sentence, the Immigration and Naturalization Service initiated
removal proceedings pursuant to section 237(a) of the Immigration
and Nationality Act, which permits deportation of an alien
convicted of “an aggravated felony.” An immigration
judge and the Board of Immigration Appeals ordered
petitioner’s deportation, and he appealed. The Eleventh
Circuit dismissed his petition for review, relying on its precedent
that a conviction under Florida’s DUI statute is a crime of
violence under 18 U.S.C. § 16. Reversing, the Supreme Court
held that state DUI offenses such as Florida’s, which either
do not have a mens rea component or require only a showing
of negligence in the operation of a vehicle, are not crimes of
violence under 18 U.S.C. § 16. Noting that the federal
statute’s critical aspect is that a crime of violence
involves the “use . . . of physical force against”
another’s person or property, which requires active
employment, the Court found that section 16(a) suggests a higher
degree of intent than negligent or merely accidental conduct.
Moreover, the Court found that, although section 16(b) sweeps more
broadly than section 16(a), it does not encompass all negligent
conduct, such as negligent operation of a vehicle. The Court found
that the ordinary meaning of the term “crime of
violence,” combined with section 16’s emphasis on the
use of physical force against another (or the risk of having to use
such force in committing a crime), suggests a category of violent,
active crimes that cannot be said naturally to include DUI
offenses. Accordingly, the Court held that petitioner’s DUI
offense is not a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 16.
Additional Information
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