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Doe v. Boston Pub. Sch.
No. 03-1886 (1st Cir. Feb. 6, 2004) ; Clearinghouse Number: 55599
Description
First Circuit Holds that IDEA Plaintiff Who Obtains Desired Result Through Private Settlement Is Not “Prevailing Party” Entitled to Attorney Fees
Abstract
Holding that the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Buckhannon
Board and Care Home v. West Virginia Department of Health and Human
Resources, 532 U.S. 598 (2001) (Clearinghouse No. 53373),
“is presumed to apply generally to all fee-shifting statutes
that use the ‘prevailing party’ terminology, including
the IDEA [Individuals with Disabilities Education Act],” the
First Circuit upheld the district court’s denial of
plaintiff’s motion for attorney fees. Plaintiff was entitled
to services under the IDEA. Defendant rejected plaintiff’s
father’s request for placement in a private residential
school. Just before a Bureau of Special Education Appeals hearing,
father accepted defendant’s offer of placement in a private
therapeutic day school program. The hearing officer refused to read
the placement into the record, denied plaintiff’s motion to
affirm the placement as a final judgment, and dismissed
plaintiff’s IDEA claims. Plaintiff sued in district court for
attorney fees. Relying on Buckhannon’s definition of
“prevailing party,” the district court granted
defendant’s motion to dismiss because plaintiff had obtained
neither a judgment on the merits nor a court-ordered consent
decree. On appeal, plaintiff urged the First Circuit to follow the
Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of Buckhannon set
forth in Barrios v. California Interscholastic Federation,
277 F.3d 1128, cert. denied, 537 U.S. 820 (2002??) (Clearinghouse
No. 54396), which permitted attorney fees following private
settlement of an Americans with Disabilities Act claim. The First
Circuit described Barrios as “seem[ing] to
contravene the Supreme Court’s unambiguous rejection of
private settlement as sufficient grounds for ‘prevailing
party’ status” and noted that the other three circuits
(Second, Third, and Seventh) that had applied Buckhannon
to the IDEA had ruled against plaintiffs. The First Circuit
concluded that IDEA plaintiffs who reached private settlements
“may not, in the absence of judicial imprimatur, be
considered ‘prevailing parties.’”
