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Vaughn v. Principi
02-7019 (Fed. Cir. July 24, 2003) ; Clearinghouse Number: 55372
Description
Veterans’ Court Remands to Board of Veterans’ Appeals Do Not Entitle Claimants to Equal Access to Justice Act Attorney Fees as Prevailing Parties, Federal Circuit Finds
Abstract
The Federal Circuit affirmed a decision by the Court of Appeals for
Veterans’ Claims that remands to the Board of Veterans’
Appeals did not entitle claimants of veterans’ benefits to
attorney fees as “prevailing parties” under the Equal
Access to Justice Act. In so ruling, the Federal Circuit relied on
decisions in Buckhannon Board and Care Home Inc. v. West
Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources, 532 U.S.
598 (2001) (Clearinghouse No. 53,373), and Brickwood
Contractors v. United States, 288 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
The Federal Circuit consolidated two Equal Access to Justice Act
appeals: one had been remanded for readjudication after passage of
the Veterans’ Claims Assistance Act of 2000; the other remand
followed claimant’s motion for reconsideration based on newly
acquired material evidence. The court said that Buckhannon
drew a bright line between enforceable judgments on the merits or
court-ordered consent decrees on the one hand, which permitted
prevailing-party status and a fee award, and achievement of the
desired outcome by the “catalyst theory” on the other
hand, where voluntary change in the defendant’s conduct as
the result of a lawsuit did not confer prevailing-party status. The
court found that the remands in both cases before it were premised
on the catalyst theory and fell squarely on the side of the bright
line that did not entitle parties to Equal Access to Justice Act
fee awards. The remands did not give claimants any relief on the
merits of their claims but only offered an opportunity for further
adjudication.
