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Powell v. Hous. Auth. of Pittsburgh
812 A.2d 1201 (Pa. 2002) ; Clearinghouse Number: 55070
Description
Because of Family Member’s Criminal Activity, Housing Authority May Terminate Section 8 Assistance Without Proving That Activity Threatened Health and Safety of Others in Vicinity
Abstract
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court allowed appellant public housing
authority (PHA), without having to satisfy 42 U.S.C. §
1437f(d)(1)(B)(iii), to terminate Section 8 tenant’s
assistance because of the violent criminal activity of
tenant’s family members. PHA terminated appellee Section 8
tenant’s assistance after her two teenaged sons carjacked a
vehicle in a parking lot about a mile from tenant’s
apartment. The court of common pleas reinstated her assistance, and
the commonwealth court affirmed. Concluding that the U.S.
Department of Housing and Urban Development’s regulations
were excessive in scope, the commonwealth court held that a PHA had
authority to terminate Section 8 assistance only for violent
criminal activity threatening the health, safety, or right to
peaceful enjoyment of other residents or persons residing in the
immediate vicinity of the Section 8 dwelling. Applying Chevron
U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837
(1984), the supreme court concluded that Congress had not plainly
and unambiguously expressed its intent as to whether a PHA had
authority to terminate, based on a family member’s violent
criminal activity, Section 8 assistance without having to satisfy
Section 1437f(d)(1)(B)(iii) and that the regulations, insofar as
having no Section 1437f(d)(1)(B)(iii) standard, were a
“permissible construction” of Section 8 and entitled to
deference. The supreme court, reversing the commonwealth court,
held that a PHA had authority to terminate Section 8 benefits
because of a family member’s violent criminal activity
without having to prove that the activity threatened the health,
safety, or right to peaceful enjoyment of the premises by other
residents or those of persons residing in the immediate vicinity of
the Section 8 premises.
