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Hibbs v. Nev. Dep't of Human Res.
123 S.Ct. 1972 (2003) ; Clearinghouse Number: 54329
Description
Family and Medical Leave Act Claim Not Barred by Eleventh Amendment, U.S. Supreme Court Rules
Abstract
The U.S. Supreme Court allowed state employees to recover money
damages under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA). Respondent
employee of state agency sought leave to care for his ill wife.
Agency granted his request for twelve weeks’ leave under the
FMLA but then informed him that he had exhausted that leave.
Respondent did not return to work, was terminated, and sued. He
claimed that agency interfered with his rights under the FMLA. The
district court found that respondent’s FMLA claim was barred
by the Eleventh Amendment and that his Fourteenth Amendment rights
had not been violated. The Ninth Circuit reversed the district
court’s finding, and petitioner appealed. The Supreme Court
held that Congress could abrogate the states’ Eleventh
Amendment immunity from suit in federal court if it made its
intention to abrogate unmistakably clear in the language of the
statute and exercised its power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Here the FMLA satisfied the clear statement rule, and
Congress sought within its authority to abrogate the states’
immunity for purposes of the FMLA’s family leave provision.
The Court noted that, in enacting the FMLA, Congress heard
significant evidence of states’ sex discrimination in
administering leave benefits; the evidence was weighty enough to
justify the enactment of prophylactic legislation under Section 5.
The Court distinguished its holdings in Board of Trustees of
University of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001)
(Clearinghouse No. 52,744), and Kimel v. Florida Board of
Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (1998) (Clearinghouse No. 52,102); the
Section 5 legislation at issue in those cases addressed state
officials’ tendency to make age- or disability-based
distinctions—characteristics that are not judged under
heightened review standards but must pass equal protection muster
if there is a rational basis for enacting them.
