Hibbs v. Nev. Dep't of Human Res.

123 S.Ct. 1972 (2003) ; Clearinghouse Number: 54329

Description

Family and Medical Leave Act Claim Not Barred by Eleventh Amendment, U.S. Supreme Court Rules

Abstract

The U.S. Supreme Court allowed state employees to recover money damages under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA). Respondent employee of state agency sought leave to care for his ill wife. Agency granted his request for twelve weeks’ leave under the FMLA but then informed him that he had exhausted that leave. Respondent did not return to work, was terminated, and sued. He claimed that agency interfered with his rights under the FMLA. The district court found that respondent’s FMLA claim was barred by the Eleventh Amendment and that his Fourteenth Amendment rights had not been violated. The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s finding, and petitioner appealed. The Supreme Court held that Congress could abrogate the states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit in federal court if it made its intention to abrogate unmistakably clear in the language of the statute and exercised its power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Here the FMLA satisfied the clear statement rule, and Congress sought within its authority to abrogate the states’ immunity for purposes of the FMLA’s family leave provision. The Court noted that, in enacting the FMLA, Congress heard significant evidence of states’ sex discrimination in administering leave benefits; the evidence was weighty enough to justify the enactment of prophylactic legislation under Section 5. The Court distinguished its holdings in Board of Trustees of University of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001) (Clearinghouse No. 52,744), and Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (1998) (Clearinghouse No. 52,102); the Section 5 legislation at issue in those cases addressed state officials’ tendency to make age- or disability-based distinctions—characteristics that are not judged under heightened review standards but must pass equal protection muster if there is a rational basis for enacting them.

Additional Information

Attorney Information
Respondent represented by Judith L. Lichtman, Jodi Grant, Renuka E. Raofield, National Partnership for Women & Families, 1875 Connecticut Ave., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20009 (202.986.2600); Cornelia T.L. Pillard, Georgetown University Law Center, 600 New Jersey Ave., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20001 (202.662.9391)
Docket Date
2003-05-27 00:00:00+00:00

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