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Holley v. Meyer
123 S. Ct. 824 (2003) ; Clearinghouse Number: 54025
Description
U.S. Supreme Court Holds That Corporate Owner Is Not Vicariously Liable Under Fair Housing Act for Employee’s Discriminatory Actions
Abstract
The U.S. Supreme Court held that the Fair Housing Act imposed
liability without fault on an employer in accordance with
traditional agency principles, that is, the Act normally imposed
vicarious liability on the corporation but not on its officers or
owners. Respondents, an interracial couple, tried to buy a house
listed for sale by a real estate corporation. A corporate salesman,
allegedly for racially discriminatory reasons, prevented
respondents from buying the house. After filing suit in federal
court against salesman and real estate corporation, respondents
filed a separate suit against petitioner, the corporation’s
president, sole shareholder, and licensed
“officer/broker.” The district court, consolidating the
lawsuits and dismissing the claims against petitioner, found that
the Act did not impose personal vicarious liability on a corporate
officer. Reversing the district court, the Ninth Circuit held
corporate owners and officers to be vicariously liable for an
employee’s violations of the Act because the Act specified
liability for those who directed or controlled or had the right to
direct or control another’s conduct regarding the sale of a
dwelling or provision of brokerage services. Reversing the Ninth
Circuit, the Supreme Court found that Congress said nothing in the
Act or its legislative history about extending traditional
vicarious liability in this manner. Moreover, the U.S. Department
of Housing and Urban Development specified that ordinary vicarious
liability rules applied, and the Court ordinarily deferred to an
administering agency’s reasonable statutory interpretation.
Finding that nothing in the Act’s language or legislative
history supported the existence of a corporate owner’s or
officer’s “nondelegable duty” not to
discriminate, the Court vacated the Ninth Circuit’s judgment
and remanded the case.
