Pollard v. E. I. du Pont

121 S. Ct. 1946 ; Clearinghouse Number: 53845

Description

Front Pay Awards in Title VII Cases Are Not Subject to the Damages Cap That 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3) Imposes

Abstract

The Supreme Court held that front pay was not an element of compensatory damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and thus not subject to the damages cap section 1981a(b)(3) imposed. Petitioner employee alleged that, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, her former employer subjected her to a hostile work environment. Finding that petitioner had been sexually harassed, the district court awarded her $300,000 in compensatory damages—the maximum allowed under section 1981a(b)(3). The Sixth Circuit affirmed, and petitioner appealed. The Supreme Court found that plaintiffs who alleged employment discrimination on the basis of sex traditionally had been entitled to such remedies as injunctions, reinstatement, back pay, lost benefits, and attorney fees under section 706(g) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. In the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Congress expanded the remedies available to these plaintiffs by permitting, for the first time, recovery of compensatory and punitive damages, subject to a statutory cap. The Court found that the 1991 Act’s plain language made clear that the newly authorized section 1981a remedies were in addition to the relief that section 706(g) authorized. The Court also found that section 706(g) authorized back-pay awards (which Title VII calls front-pay awards) for the period between the date of judgment and the date of reinstatement. Because section 706(g) already authorized front pay, the Court found that Congress had not limited the availability of such awards under section 1981a. Instead, the Court held, Congress sought to expand the available remedies by permitting the recovery of compensatory and punitive damages in addition to previously available remedies, such as front pay.

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Attorney Information
Docket Date
2001-06-04 00:00:00+00:00

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