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Quaratino v. Tiffany & Co.
No. 97-7096 (2d Cir. Jan. 26, 1999) ; Clearinghouse Number: 52269
Description
Second Circuit Rejects "Billing Judgment" Approach in Awarding Civil Rights Plaintiff Fees Proportionate to Her Final Recovery
Abstract
Reversing, the Second Circuit held that the district court erred in
failing to award plaintiffs the lodestar amount in attorney fees in
this employment discrimination case. Plaintiff employee had alleged
that defendant employer discriminated against her in violation of
Title VII and the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 42 U.S.C. §
2000e(k). She later added a retaliation claim after she was passed
over for promotion. The jury rejected plaintiff’s pregnancy
discrimination claim but awarded plaintiff $158,145 in compensatory
and punitive damages on her retaliation claim. Plaintiff
subsequently sought attorney fees. The district court declined to
award its calculated lodestar amount of $124,645 and instead
awarded fees of one-half of plaintiff’s recovery at trial. On
appeal, plaintiff argued that the district court’s novel
"billing judgment" approach was not supported by law.
Under the district court’s approach, an attorney’s
requested fee would be judged reasonable if it were rationally
related to the monetary recovery that the attorney could have
expected ex ante. Noting that Congress enacted fee shifting in
civil rights cases precisely because the expected monetary recovery
in many cases was too small to attract effective legal
representation, the court of appeals held that the district
court’s approach conflicted with the legislative intent and
rationale of the fee-shifting statute by relinking the
effectiveness of a civil rights plaintiff’s legal
representation solely to the dollar value of her claim. The
district court’s approach was not saved by its proposed
exception, which would allow fees out of line with monetary
recovery in cases involving a new important legal principle in
civil rights. The court found that the public interest in civil
rights enforcement was not limited to those cases that
"push[ed] the legal envelope" and was perhaps most
meaningfully served by day-to-day enforcement, which secured
compliance and deterred future violations.
