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In re Holmberg
No. IP 98-0342-C H/G (Minn. Sup. Ct. Jan. 28, 1999). ; Clearinghouse Number: 52225
Description
Minnesota’s Administrative Process for Child Support Found Unconstitutional
Abstract
Affirming, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that the state
administrative child support process was unconstitutional because
it violated the separation-of-powers doctrine. The process had
jurisdiction over all cases to obtain, modify, or enforce child and
medical support orders or paternity orders if the custodial parent
received or either parent had applied for public assistance. Three
child support obligors filed postjudment petitions for review of
administrative orders awarding child support. In separate decisions
the trial court entered judgments against them, and obligors
appealed. Consolidating the cases, the state appellate court ruled
that the process violated the separation-of-powers doctrine. On
appeal, the state supreme court held that the administrative
process violated the separation-of-powers doctrine by (1)
infringing on the district court’s original jurisdiction; (2)
creating a tribunal which is not inferior to the district court as
mandated by the state constitution; and (3) permitting child
support officers to practice law. Noting that family-dissolution
remedies, arising in equity, were within the district court’s
original jurisdiction, the court determined that the
legislature’s delegation of this area of the law called for
close scrutiny. The court found that the administrative process not
only gave administrative law judges powers which inherently
belonged to the district court but also placed them on par with
district courts in deciding child support cases. In one respect,
administrative law judges were made superior; they were empowered
to modify child support orders granted by district courts. By
granting the power to practice law to child support officers, who
are not subject to the court’s disciplinary authority, the
legislature further removed the administrative process from the
judiciary’s supervision. The court did not reach the issues
of possible equal protection and procedural due process violations.
