Hale v. Belshé

No. 97-15177 (9th Cir. filed Mar. 28, 1997). ; Clearinghouse Number: 51594

Description

Persons with Psychiatric Disabilities Argue That State Officials Are Not Immune from Suit Against Officials’ Failure to Provide Necessary Services

Abstract

The parties have filed their briefs on appeal in the Ninth Circuit in this class action on behalf of persons with psychiatric disabilities who reside in locked nursing facilities, known as Institutions for Mental Disease (IMDs), who do not want to be there, and who, experts agree, do not need to be there. The putative class includes persons at risk of being placed in IMDs because they cannot get the services they need to live successfully in the community. Plaintiffs claim that defendant California Departments of Health Services and Mental Health violated the federal Medicaid Act by (1) allowing some Medi-Cal recipients to receive the services they need in the community while denying them to others; (2) imposing illegal limitations on the amount, duration, and scope of available mental health rehabilitation services; (3) allowing some counties to decide county by county whether to make services available; and (4) not providing services when and where needed. Plaintiffs claim that defendants shirked their duties under the federal Nursing Home Reform provisions of the Medicaid Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1396r, by not determining whether persons identified as having psychiatric disabilities needed a nursing facility level of care or care in the community. Plaintiffs also contend that defendants violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) by failing to provide services in the most integrated setting appropriate to persons with disabilities. Finding that defendants were not immune from plaintiffs’ claims under the Eleventh Amendment, the district court denied defendants’ motion to dismiss, and defendants appealed. Citing Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114 (1996), defendants argue that plaintiffs’ claims under the Medicaid Act and the Nursing Home Reform Act cannot survive since these laws were enacted under the Spending Clause, and the Eleventh Amendment provides for immunity where laws are enacted under a constitutional provision other than the Fourteenth Amendment. Defendants also argue that they are immune from plaintiffs’ ADA claims since under the Fourteenth Amendment Congress lacked authority to enact the ADA. Defendants assert that extending Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), to suits involving alleged violations of federal statutory rights frustrates the very reasons for the Eleventh Amendment without assuring the supremacy of the federal law. Plaintiffs argue that since they seek only declaratory and injunctive relief against state officials in their official capacities the Eleventh Amendment does not bar their claims. They assert that the Supreme Court has recognized the Young rule’s viability, and lower courts, in decisions pre- and post-Seminole, have applied the Young exception to cases, such as this, that challenge state officials’ violation of federal statutes regardless of the impact of such decisions on the state. Plaintiffs also argue that Congress acted under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment in abrogating state Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit under the ADA.

Additional Information

Attorney Information
Plaintiffs represented by Michael Stortz, Leslie B. Morrison, Protection & Advocacy, Inc., 449 15th St., Suite 401, Oakland, CA 94612 ((510) 839-0811); Sandra Pettit, Melinda Bird, Marilyn Holle, Eva Casas-Sarmiento, Protection & Advocacy, Inc., 3580 Wilshire Blvd., Suite 902, Los Angeles, CA 90010-2512 ((213) 427-8747); James J. Preis, Mental Health Advocacy Services, Inc., 1336 Wilshire Blvd, Suite 102, Los Angeles, CA 90017 ((213) 484-1628); Inge Dietrich, Protection & Advocacy, Inc., 100 Howe Ave., Suite 235N, Sacramento, CA 95825 ((916) 488-9950).
Docket Date
1997-03-28 00:00:00+00:00