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Benchmark Apartment Management Corp. v. Mercer
No. 96-00949 (Mass. Hous. Ct. Jan. 3, 1997). ; Clearinghouse Number: 51557
Description
Federal Notice Requirements Preempt State Statute Allowing Automatic Termination of Tenancy Based on Allegations of Illegal Conduct
Abstract
The court has ruled that federal notice requirements governing
Section 8 tenancies preempt the state nuisance forfeiture statute
to the extent that it permits a landlord, including a federally
subsidized one, to terminate a tenancy and commence an eviction
action based upon allegations of illegal conduct by tenant without
first complying with statutory written termination requirements. An
argument between defendant tenant and another tenant resulted in
the other tenant beating defendant repeatedly with a two-foot-long
metal pipe so severely that defendant had to be taken to the
hospital. Defendant, a trained security guard, struck back in
self-defense once with her nightstick. Criminal charges were filed
against the other tenant but not against defendant. Under the state
nuisance forfeiture statute and without sending a notice to quit,
plaintiff landlord sought to dispossess both tenants. The cases
were sent to mediation, and both tenants signed an agreement to
move out in 90 days. The judge to whom the agreement was brought
for approval inquired only about its voluntariness, not about any
of the underlying merits. Later, with legal counsel, defendant
sought relief under Rule 60(b); she argued that 42 U.S.C. §
1437f(d)(1)(B)(iv) and 24 C.F.R. part 247 required a
precommencement termination notice and preempted the state statute.
The court held that by entering into the agreement defendant did
not waive her right to written notice of termination and that a
tenant could not knowingly and intelligently waive a right when she
was not informed of her right. The court also noted that on the
facts she might well have had a defense on the merits as well.
While it did not find that the statute required it to conduct a
trial on the merits in every subsidized housing case brought under
it, the court did conclude that, before it approves an agreement in
a case brought under this statute, a substantive judicial colloquy
should take place to ensure that tenant’s rights were
protected, particularly when tenant was unrepresented.
Additional Information
Files
- Verified Complaint
- Referral to housing specialist department (notice agreement)
- Agreement
- Motion to vacate agreement
- Affidavit of Donella Mercer
- Plaintiff's memorandum in opposition to defendant's motion to vacate agreement
- Memorandum in support of defendant's motion to vacate agreement
- Plaintiff's supplemental memorandum in opposition to defendant's motion to vacate agreement
- Order
