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Carson v. Bethlehem Steel Corp.
82 F.3d 157 (7th Cir. 1996); No. 95-2111 (7th Cir. Apr. 22, 1996). ; Clearinghouse Number: 51179
Description
Discharged Employee Fails to Show Material Dispute Requiring Trial on Title VII Claim
Abstract
The Seventh Circuit has affirmed the district court’s ruling
that plaintiff employee was not discharged by defendant employer in
violation of Title VII. Plaintiff, who is white, was fired by a
white supervisor and replaced by another white employee.
Nonetheless, she alleged that employer discharged her because of
her race, in violation of Title VII. The district court found that
plaintiff’s replacement by a white employee prevented her
from establishing a prima facie case of discrimination.
Disagreeing, the court of appeals found that one’s
replacement being of another race, sex, or age may help raise an
inference of discrimination but it is neither a sufficient nor a
necessary condition for establishing a prima facie case under Title
VII. The court held that the central question in any employment
discrimination case was whether the employer would have taken the
same action had the employee been of a different race (age, sex,
religion, national origin, etc.) and everything else had remained
the same. However, the court found that plaintiff did not benefit
from this analysis because she had not established a material
dispute requiring trial. Further, the court found that the district
court had not abused its discretion in refusing to reopen discovery
after plaintiff changed lawyers. Noting that the seven-month
discovery period was ample, the court found no principle that each
new attorney for a litigant should have an independent opportunity
to conduct discovery.
