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Steiberger v. Sullivan
No. 84 Civ. 1302 (LBS) (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 15, 1996) ; Clearinghouse Number: 39839
Description
District Courts Issue Orders to Show Cause Why Plaintiffs’ Counsel Should Not Be Enjoined from Withdrawing Pursuant to Legal Services Corporation Restrictions
Abstract
The courts have issued orders to show cause why they should not
deny plaintiffs’ counsel’s motions to withdraw in these
related actions in which plaintiffs’ counsel made conditional
motions to withdraw pursuant to recently enacted restrictions on
Legal Services Corporation (LSC) grantees. The LSC restrictions,
enacted as part of Pub. L. No. 104-134, purport to prohibit
attorneys working at LSC-funded programs from engaging in class
action litigation. Counsel assert that their withdrawal may violate
the canons of professional responsibility and that Congress’
attempt to prohibit legal services lawyers from using nonfederal
funds to provide effective legal representation to indigent clients
is unconstitutional. By directing legal services lawyers to refrain
from making important substantive and procedural arguments that are
in their clients’ best interests, Congress violates both the
Equal Protection Clause and the First Amendment associational
rights that bind a legal services lawyer to an indigent client. In
Varshavsky the district court asked the parties, LSC, and other
interested persons to show cause why it should not enjoin LSC from
terminating funding to Legal Services for New York City (LSNY) or
Legal Services for the Elderly (LSE) as a consequence of
counsel’s complying with the court’s order to continue
representing the class. Pending hearing on the order to show cause,
the court has enjoined plaintiffs’ counsel from withdrawing,
has enjoined LSC from taking any steps to defund LSNY, and has
enjoined LSNY from taking any steps to defund LSE. In response, the
U.S. attorney submitted a letter brief arguing that if the court
determined that plaintiffs’ counsel’s ethical duties
precluded her withdrawal, or that her withdrawal was not required,
it would be improper for the court to address the constitutionality
of the LSC restrictions in this case. In Stieberger, Chater, and
Robinson, the district courts issued similar orders asking the
parties, the Attorney General, and LSC to show cause why orders
should not be entered denying plaintiffs’ counsel permission
to withdraw.
Prior History:
Preliminary Injunction Requiring Home Hearings for Persons Unable to Participate in Telephone Hearings Upheld The New York Appellate Court has upheld the lower court's order preliminarily enjoining defendant New York Department of Social Services (DSS) from refusing to accept requests for home hearings for applicants and recipients of public assistance who are homebound due to disability. Recipients of public benefits unable to travel due to disabilities depend on the state to hold fair hearings at their home when local social services agencies reduce or terminate their benefits. Plaintiffs, who are elderly and disabled, brought this class action challenging defendant DSS's abrupt elimination of this "home fair hearing" program. The lower court granted a preliminary injunction allowing DSS to hold telephone hearings for plaintiffs and requiring home hearings for plaintiffs who lost, or cannot participate in, a telephone hearing. These backup home hearings would guarantee a fair hearing for persons who lack telephones, cannot communicate well by phone, are hearing or speech impaired, or need to submit documents or cross-examine a witness to help their case. DSS appealed. Affirming, the appellate court found that plaintiffs would suffer irreparable harm from the termination of home hearings, especially in light of DSS's practice of deeming plaintiffs' requests for home hearings abandoned or waived when they do not appear at the central hearing sites. Noting that DSS's own regulations prohibited interference or limitations on the right to request a fair hearing, the court held that recipients were entitled to have a hearing--taking into account circumstances such as physical inability to travel to the hearing site--at a time and place convenient to them.Additional Information
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