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Pennington v. Didrickson
No. 92-3725 (7th Cir. Apr. 11, 1994) ; Clearinghouse Number: 39752
Description
Seventh Circuit Holds Base Period Provision of Illinois Unemployment Insurance Act Subject to Social Security Act's "When Due" Clause
Abstract
Reversing, the Seventh Circuit has held that the Illinois
Unemployment Insurance Act (IUIA)'s section 237, which defines
the base period for qualifying wages, is an administrative
provision subject to the requirements of the "when due"
clause of the Social Security Act. Claimants filed this class
action alleging that the definition of "base period" in
section 237 of the IUIA violated the "when due" clause of
section 303(a)(1) of the Social Security Act. Under section 237,
defendant Illinois Department of Employment Security (IDES) reviews
a claimant's earnings during the base period, which excludes
wages earned in the quarter immediately preceding the quarter in
which the claimant files for benefits (the "lag quarter")
and the quarter in which the claimant files to determine if the
claimant has a valid claim. When claimants do not have sufficient
earnings during the base period but would have if the lag quarter
was considered, they must wait for a quarter or more before they
may claim benefits. Plaintiffs claimed that it would be
administratively feasible for IDES to consider the lag quarter in
calculating claimants' qualifying wages. The district court
held, as a matter of law, however, that section 237 was not an
administrative method subject to the "when due" clause
but rather an "eligibility" provision. The court reasoned
that claimants who would have sufficient qualifying wages if the
lag quarter wages were included did not experience any
"delay" in receiving benefits because those benefits were
not "due."Reversing, the Seventh Circuit held that
section 237 is subject to the clause and remanded for a
determination of defendant's compliance with its requirements.
Relying on Jenkins v. Bowling, 691 F.2d 1225 (7th Cir. 1982), the
Seventh Circuit concluded that the treatment of section 237 (which
determines when IDES will count certain earnings as qualifying
wages) as an eligibility provision would render the "when
due" clause a virtual nullity, limiting it to cases in which
the state concedes that unemployment is due to an individual and
simply fails to establish administrative mechanisms that pay the
individual within a reasonable time. The court noted that a
contrary decision would allow IDES to delay determination of
eligibility and erode the congressional intent of requiring prompt
administrative provision of unemployment benefits.
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