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Feeling v. Kelly
No. 82-2994 (D.D.C. Feb. 25, 1994) ; Clearinghouse Number: 36026
Description
Court Modifies, But Refuses to Vacate, 1986 Consent Judgment Requiring Prompt Processing of Emergency Assistance Applications
Abstract
The district court has denied the District of Columbia's motion
to vacate a 1986 consent judgment under which defendant agreed to
provide applicants for AFDC Emergency Assistance (EA) services
within eight days of completing an application. Inadequate
compliance with this order by defendant led to motions for contempt
in 1988 and 1993. In 1988, the court adopted defendant's
suggestions to hold regular task force meetings to consider the
problems in the EA program and to supply monthly reports to
plaintiffs' counsel. In 1993, the District passed emergency
legislation altering the number of days within which it must
process EA applications from 8 to 12 days. Defendant, contending
that it was now in compliance not with the 8-day processing rule
but with the 12-day rule, then filed a motion to vacate the
contempt order. Arguing that the decision in Suter v. Artist M.,
112 S. Ct. 1360 (1992), removed a federal right of action to
challenge EA, it also sought to vacate the original consent
judgment. The court rejected this latter motion and held that
several of plaintiffs' claims, as well as the parties'
desire to avoid costly litigation, provided support for the consent
judgment. The court did, however, find that the District's
modification of the period in which to provide assistance was
consistent with the underlying purpose of the consent judgment, and
therefore defendant was in substantial compliance with the order.
In so ruling, the court stressed that the modification was not
automatic, as argued by defendant, but rather required action by
the court.
Additional Information
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