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Hyatt v. Sullivan
No. C-C-83-655-M (W.D.N.C. May 23, 1994) ; Clearinghouse Number: 35159
Description
Court Extends Deadline for Filing EAJA Fee Petition Because of Unclear Time Limit and Plaintiffs’ Good-Faith Action
Abstract
Finding that the applicable time limit is unclear, plaintiffs have
acted in good faith, and defendants were not prejudiced by the
delay, the district court has extended the filing deadline for
plaintiffs’ motion for attorney fees under the EAJA, 28
U.S.C. § 2412(b) and (d). The parties had recently settled
this 11-year-old class action which challenged defendant Secretary
of HHS’s failure to use the Fourth Circuit’s standard
of pain in disability benefit petitions in North Carolina. Seeking
an estimated $775,000 for six years of work on the case, plaintiffs
moved for attorney fees under both sections 2412(b) and 2412(d) of
the EAJA. Under section 2412(d)(1)(B), EAJA fee petitions must be
filed within 30 days after the judgment has become final and
nonappealable. Although plaintiffs filed the motion within the time
limit established by section 2412(d)(1)(B), they did not meet the
14-day-after-entry-of-judgment deadline established by the recent
amendments to Rule 54 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In
their motion, plaintiffs requested the court to interpret the
effect of Rule 54 on the time limit for filing EAJA fee petitions.
They noted that, although statutes containing their own deadline
for fees are not subject to the time limit contained in Rule
54(d)(2)(B), the literal language of the EAJA statute could be
interpreted to restrict the applicability of the time limit in its
section 2412(d)(1)(B) to fees sought under section 2412(d), and not
to petitions sought under section 2412(b). The time limit in Rule
54(d) would then appear to apply, by default, to fees sought under
subsection (b). Plaintiffs argued that, if the court should find
that Rule 54(d)(2)(B) applies to fees sought under EAJA section
2412(b), the court should enter an order waiving the 14-day time
limit because Rule 54(d)(2)(B) gives the court discretion to extend
the 14-day limit, uncertainty is generated by the rule and its
possible application to this case, and plaintiffs reasonably
believed that the time limit for filing the petition was controlled
by the EAJA. Plaintiffs also argued that the purpose of requiring
motions for fees to be filed within the 14-day period, as explained
in the official commentary to the amendment to Rule 54, was
inapplicable to the case. The court extended the deadline for
filing for fees. Counsel notes that future EAJA applicants should
be aware of this issue, particularly given the recent authority for
market-rate fees under section 2412(b) provided by Hyatt v.
Shalala, 6 F.3d 250 (4th Cir. 1993).
Additional Information
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